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INTRODUCTION
Each year millions of immigrants labor in workplaces across the
country, even though they do not have proper authorization from U.S.
immigration authorities to do so.  As “undocumented workers,” they un-
comfortably straddle two legal regimes: immigration law and workplace
law.  Because of their undocumented immigration status, immigration
law formally excludes these workers from such things as voting, the
workplace, and access to most federal public benefits.  As a matter of
immigration law, they are not allowed to be present in the United States
at all.  Nonetheless, because of their status as employees who perform
labor, “workplace law” simultaneously provides them with workplace
protections related to wages, health and safety, collective action with
* Proskauer Assistant Professor of Employment and Labor Law, Industrial and Labor
Relations School, Cornell University.  I appreciate the insightful workshop presentations by
Annette Bernhardt, Muzaffar Chishti, Ruben Garcia, and Leticia Saucedo, and the thoughtful
comments from Lance Compa, Leslie Gates, Tamara Lee, Leticia Saucedo, and my fellow
Immigration Team members at Cornell’s Institute for the Social Sciences (ISS) on an earlier
draft.  A special thank you to Vanessa Clarke, Tashlin Lakhani, and Patrick Oakford for their
research efforts and to the editors of the Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy for their
careful editorial assistance.  I take sole responsibility for all errors or omissions.
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their co-workers, and employment discrimination based on race, color,
religion, sex, ethnicity, and national origin.
In this way, undocumented workers exemplify a new trend in law
that questions long-held notions about the separation between immigra-
tion law and workplace law.  Typically, immigration law and workplace
law have been considered discrete areas of legal inquiry with entirely
separate policymaking processes.1  Thus, it is no surprise that the major-
ity of professional associations, law journals, law conferences, law
school courses, and legal scholars separately address immigration law on
the one hand and workplace law on the other.  Moreover, there has been
significant scholarly focus on the ways that these two areas of law have
distinct policy rationales and enforcement schemes.2  Legal scholars
have often emphasized, for instance, that public entities traditionally en-
force immigration law while private entities traditionally enforce work-
place law through employee-initiated complaints.3
Despite these seemingly distinct lines of inquiry, a growing commu-
nity of scholars has started to break down the boundaries between immi-
gration and workplace law.4  As I have argued elsewhere, a new hybrid
1 Ruben J. Garcia, Ghost Workers in an Interconnected World: Going Beyond the Di-
chotomies of Domestic Immigration and Labor Laws, 36 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 737, 740
(2003) (“Historically, immigration law and labor law have not been linked in the policymaking
process.”).  Nonetheless, at various historical moments there have been connections between
labor and immigration agencies. A federal immigration agency, for instance, was housed
within the U.S. Department of Labor for a number of decades before 1940. See Reorganiza-
tion Plan No. V, 5 Reg. 2223 (June 14, 1940).  Moreover, the immigration agency and labor
agency, along with other agencies, “jointly administered” the Bracero guestworker program
(1942-64) until its termination. See Stephen Lee, Monitoring Immigration Enforcement, 53
ARIZ. L. REV. 1089, 1118–19 (2011).
2 See, e.g., Kati L. Griffith, Discovering “Immployment” Law: The Constitutionality of
Subfederal Immigration Regulation at Work, 29 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 389, 392 (2011)
(describing workplace law’s “inclusiveness of a broad class of workers, including undocu-
mented workers and the exclusiveness of [immigration] laws prohibiting the employment of
undocumented workers entirely.”); Catherine L. Fisk & Michael J. Wishnie, The Story of Hoff-
man Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB: Labor Rights without Remedies for Undocumented
Immigrants, in LABOR LAW STORIES 399, 400 (Laura J. Cooper & Catherine L. Fisk eds.,
2005) (noting the “sometimes contradictory legislative impulses” of immigration and work-
place law).
3 See Juliet Stumpf & Bruce Friedman, Advancing Civil Rights Through Immigration
Law: One Step Forward, Two Steps Back?, 6 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 131, 134–35
(2002) (describing the largely public enforcement scheme of immigration law and the largely
private enforcement scheme of workplace law).
4 See generally Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, Redefining the Rights of Undocumented
Workers, 58 AM. U. L. REV. 1361 (2009); Garcia, supra note 1; Kati L. Griffith, U.S. Migrant
Worker Law: The Interstices of Immigration Law and Labor and Employment Law, 31 COMP.
LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 125 (2009); Stephen Lee, Private Immigration Screening in the Work-
place, 61 STAN. L. REV. 1103 (2009); Leticia M. Saucedo, Immigration Enforcement Versus
Employment Law Enforcement: The Case for Integrated Protections in the Immigrant Work-
place, 38 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 303 (2010); Jayesh M. Rathod, Immigrant Labor and the Occu-
pational Safety and Health Regime, 33 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 479 (2009); Stumpf &
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area of law has emerged, what I call immployment law, at the crossroads
of immigration and employment policies.5  Through its focus on undocu-
mented workers in particular, this Article further justifies the need to
move away from the immigration law-workplace law dichotomy and to
more fully embrace immployment law as a crucial field of inquiry.
Because this nascent “field” is somewhat fragmented and consti-
tuted by a diverse set of actors (scholars, legislators, courts, enforcement
agents, and advocates), there is a pressing need for a more integrated
understanding of the sometimes complementary, sometimes conflict
prone, relationship between immigration law and employment policies.
This Article endeavors to comprehensively outline the emerging field of
immployment law.  As this Article specifies below, this field broadly in-
cludes empirical, legislative, administrative, judicial, and other analytical
inquiries and trends involving workers who bridge the divide between
immigration law and workplace law.
This Article also proposes directions for future research in this area.
Namely, it raises a broad array of compelling questions that merit inten-
sive scholarly, judicial, and policy analysis moving forward.  As this Ar-
ticle will show, a hybrid analytical lens reveals otherwise obscured areas
of inquiry.  It thereby encourages scholars, policymakers, enforcement
agency officials, and courts to more comprehensively develop immploy-
ment frameworks and research agendas that directly consider the interac-
tion between immigration and employment protections for employees.
To support these contentions, this Article draws from a variety of
recent scholarly, legislative, case law, enforcement, and advocacy devel-
opments in the immployment law area.  It also builds on the contributions
of leading experts and scholars in this issue of the Cornell Journal of
Law and Public Policy and at a recent workshop organized by Cornell
University’s Institute for the Social Sciences.6  The workshop, similar to
this Article, was entitled “Undocumented Workers: Crossing the Borders
of Immigration and Workplace Law” (hereinafter the “Crossing the Bor-
ders Workshop”).
I. THE UNDOCUMENTED WORKFORCE
Recent empirical trends in immigration demand that we embrace,
and more thoroughly examine, the intensifying interaction between im-
migration and workplace law.  Specifically, the large and growing num-
ber of undocumented workers in the United States is a compelling reason
for crossing the borders of immigration and workplace law.  These work-
Friedman, supra note 3; Michael J. Wishnie, Prohibiting the Employment of Unauthorized
Immigrants: The Experiment Fails, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 193 (2007).
5 See generally Griffith, supra note 2.
6 See discussion infra Parts II, VI, and VIII.
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ers, as described above, have a legally-constructed dual personality as
they are simultaneously regulated by immigration law and workplace
law.
TABLE 1: UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRANTS IN THE LABOR FORCE*
* JEFFREY S. PASSEL & D’VERA COHN, UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANT POPULATION:
NATIONAL AND STATE TRENDS, 2010, 17, tb. 6 (Pew Hispanic Center 2011), availa-
ble at http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/133.pdf.
Empirical studies illustrate that undocumented workers are increas-
ingly participating in the U.S. labor force in recent decades.  In 1980,
undocumented workers comprised an estimated two percent of the total
U.S. labor force.7  As Table 1 shows, by 2010, undocumented workers
represented 5.2 percent of the U.S. labor force.  There has been an in-
crease in the total number of undocumented workers in the United States
as well.  In 2000, there were 5.5 million undocumented workers in the
U.S. labor force.  By 2010, the number of undocumented workers
reached 8 million.
While the percentage of undocumented workers in the U.S. labor
force (5.2 percent) may seem fairly modest to some observers, data show
that undocumented workers represent a significant presence in particular
occupations.  Table 2 illustrates that, in 2008, twenty-five percent of in-
dividuals engaged in the farming occupational group were undocu-
mented.  Some analysts believe that this estimate is conservative and that
the percentage of undocumented workers in this occupation is actually
7 B. LINDSAY LOWELL ET AL., MIGRATION POLICY INSTITUTE, IMMIGRANTS AND LABOR
FORCE TRENDS: THE FUTURE, PAST, AND PRESENT 11 (2006), available at http://www.migra-
tionpolicy.org/ITFIAF/TF17_Lowell.pdf.
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TABLE 2: PERCENTAGE OF UNDOCUMENTED WORKERS
BY OCCUPATION, 2008*
* JEFFREY S. PASSEL & D’VERA COHN, A PORTRAIT OF UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANTS
IN THE UNITED STATES 15, fig. 19 (Pew Hispanic Center 2009) (tabulations from
augmented March 2008 CPS), available at http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/107.
pdf.
much higher.8  The U.S. Department of Labor, for instance, has esti-
mated that more than half of all of the farmworkers in the United States
are undocumented immigrants.9  As Table 2 demonstrates, undocu-
mented workers play a prominent role in other occupational groups as
well.  An estimated seventeen percent of construction workers and
nineteen percent of workers in building, grounds-keeping, and mainte-
nance are undocumented.
Along with their concentration in particular occupational groups,
undocumented workers are concentrated in particular states and regions
8 See, e.g., Workforce Challenges Facing the Agriculture Industry: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Workforce Protections of the H. Comm. on Educ. and the Workforce, 112th
Cong. 1 (2011) (statement of Bruce Goldstein, President, Farmworker Justice) (“More than
one-half of the approximately 2 million seasonal workers on our farms and ranches lack au-
thorized immigration status.”).
9 Garance Burke, Few Americans Seem Eager to Try Their Hands at Farm Work,
WASH. POST, Oct. 10, 2010, at A9 (reporting that, according to the Labor Department, “[m]ore
than half of the farmworkers in the United States are illegal immigrants”).
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of the U.S. as well.  Among the states with the highest percentages of
undocumented workers in their state workforces are, for instance, Ne-
vada with 10 percent, California with 9.7 percent, Texas with 9 percent,
and New Jersey with 8.6 percent.10
Thus, the recent data on undocumented workers’ labor force partici-
pation challenges the historical divide between immigration and work-
place law.  This is the case because these significant labor force
participants are simultaneously subject to both legal regimes.
II. WORKPLACE LAW VIOLATIONS AGAINST THE UNDOCUMENTED
The apparent rise of workplace law violations against undocu-
mented immigrant workers is another reason to scrutinize the crossroads
between immigration and workplace law.  Annette Bernhardt’s presenta-
tion at the Crossing the Borders Workshop, entitled “Unregulated Work:
The Perfect Storm of Economic Restructuring and Immigration Policy,”
illustrated the prevalence of workplace law violations against low-wage
workers in general and undocumented immigrant workers in particular.11
Her presentation was based largely on 2008 survey data of low-wage
workers in the three largest U.S. cities.12  This study is one of the few
existing empirical evaluations of workplace law violations in low-wage
and immigrant industries.
According to the survey, low-wage undocumented workers are
more than twice as likely to suffer minimum wage violations in the
workplace as low-wage U.S.-born workers.13  While 15.6 percent of all
of the U.S-born workers surveyed experienced minimum wage violations
in the week before the survey, 37.1 percent of undocumented workers
experienced minimum wage violations during that same period.14
The survey results on overtime violations against low-wage workers
follow a similar pattern.  Almost 85 percent of undocumented workers
experienced an overtime violation in the workweek before the survey.15
10 Jeffrey S. Passel and D’Vera Cohn, Unauthorized Immigrant Population: National
and State Trends, 2010, PEW HISPANIC CENTER (Feb. 1, 2011) 17, available at http://pew
hispanic.org/files/reports/133.pdf.
11 Annette Bernhardt, Unregulated Work: The Perfect Storm of Economic Restructuring
and Immigration Policy, Presentation at the Cornell ISS Workshop on Labor Immigration:
Good or Bad for America? (Sept. 23, 2011) (presentation available at http://www.ctl1.com/
publicaccess/iss/iss-sem-20110923-eng-ab/index.htm).
12 See generally ANNETTE BERNHARDT ET AL., BROKEN LAWS, UNPROTECTED WORKERS:
VIOLATIONS OF EMPLOYMENT AND LABOR LAWS IN AMERICA’S CITIES (2009), available at
http://nelp.3cdn.net/b294e0aad2ba7008e3_2pm6br7gi.pdf.
13 NAT’L EMPLOYMENT LAW PROJECT, WORKPLACE VIOLATIONS, IMMIGRATION STATUS,
AND GENDER: SUMMARY OF FINDINGS FROM THE 2008 UNREGULATED WORK SURVEY (2011),
available at http://nelp.3cdn.net/56a1b2d09120b5c83c_2qm6idnf4.pdf.
14 Id.
15 Id.
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In contrast, 68.2 percent of U.S.-born workers suffered an overtime vio-
lation in the week before the survey.16  Strikingly, the survey results sig-
nify that undocumented women workers experienced these violations at
much higher rates than undocumented males.  Undocumented women
workers suffered minimum wage violations at a rate of 47.4 percent.17 In
comparison, 29.5 percent of undocumented men experienced minimum
wage violations.18
Since there is such scarce empirical data on workplace law viola-
tions in low-wage and immigrant workforces, scholars should continue to
research these trends.  The existing data on workplace law violations in
low-wage and immigrant workforces provides, nonetheless, another jus-
tification for evaluating the interaction between immigration and work-
place law.  The above survey findings demonstrate a significant
correlation between undocumented immigration status and instances of
workplace law violations, when compared to workplace law violations
against U.S.-born workers.  Given these survey findings, future scholar-
ship should investigate both why low-wage undocumented immigrant
workers experience workplace law violations at higher rates than their
U.S.-born counterparts and what can account for the gender differences
in the findings.
III. FEDERAL WORKPLACE-BASED IMMIGRATION LAW
A substantial change to federal immigration law in 1986 was un-
doubtedly the most crucial legislative development in the immployment
law area in recent history.  In that year, the U.S. Congress enacted the
Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA).19  IRCA itself can be
characterized as an “immployment law” because it introduced, for the
first time in U.S. immigration law history, an immigration enforcement
scheme that targeted the workplace as a key site to deter undocumented
immigration.  As the U.S. Supreme Court has stated, “IRCA forcefully
made combating the employment of illegal aliens central to the policy of
immigration law.”20
16 Id. For another study illustrating that undocumented workers experience workplace
law violations at higher rates than documented workers see CHIRAG MEHTA ET AL., UNIV. OF
ILL. AT CHI. CTR. FOR URBAN ECON. DEV., CHICAGO’S UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRANTS: AN
ANALYSIS OF WAGES, WORKING CONDITIONS AND ECONOMIC CONTRIBUTIONS 27 (2002),
available at http://www.urbaneconomy.org/sites/default/files/undoc_wages_working_64.pdf.
17 See UNREGULATED WORK SURVEY supra note 13.
18 Id.
19 Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat.
3359 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
20 Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 535 U.S. 137, 147 (2002) (emphasis
added) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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IRCA regulates the relationship between employers and their em-
ployees, a relationship that is also the focal point of workplace law, in a
number of ways.  Whereas workplace law requires employers to provide
certain protections to their employees and to avoid discriminating against
them based on a number of employee characteristics, IRCA requires em-
ployers to verify whether immigration law authorizes their employees to
work in the United States.  Under federal law, most employers can
choose to use a paper-based verification system (I-9 forms) or an elec-
tronic verification system (E-Verify).21  Moreover, IRCA imposes civil
and, in serious cases, criminal sanctions on employers who knowingly
employ undocumented workers.22  While it does not make employees’
performance of labor illegal, it does provide sanctions for employees
who knowingly use fraudulent documents to gain employment.23
IRCA also brings immigration law into the employer-employee re-
lationship in ways that explicitly complement existing workplace protec-
tions for employees.  Indeed, “IRCA’s 15-year legislative history
illustrates Congress’s concern about employees’ workplace rights and the
employment discrimination that could result from the imposition of
workplace-based immigration enforcement.” 24  When Congress enacted
IRCA, it included two main elements that further illustrate this concern
for employees’ workplace protections.  First, as part of the legislation, it
appropriated funding to the U.S. Department of Labor’s efforts to en-
force wage and hour law on behalf of undocumented workers.25
Second, it included employment discrimination prohibitions which,
among other things, make it unlawful for employers to take adverse em-
ployment actions against employees or prospective employees because of
their national origin or their citizenship status.26  Federal immigration
law’s protection against citizenship-status discrimination prohibits em-
ployers from favoring a U.S.-citizen applicant/employee over a work-
authorized non-citizen applicant/employee.27  Lawmakers included these
protections due to ongoing concerns that employer sanctions would cre-
21 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b) (2006).  Federal contractors, however, do not have a choice.  By
executive order, they are required to use the E-Verify system. See Exec. Order No. 13,465, 73
Fed. Reg. 33,285 (June 11, 2008).
22 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(e)–(f) (2006).  For a comprehensive discussion of the private sec-
tor’s extensive role in immigration enforcement post-IRCA, see Lee, supra note 4.
23 8 U.S.C. § 1324c(a) (2006).
24 Kati L. Griffith, ICE Was Not Meant to be Cold: The Case for Civil Rights Monitoring
of Immigration Enforcement in the Workplace, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 1137, 1144–45 (2011).
25 Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 § 111(d), 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (2006).
26 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(a)(1) (2006).
27 Unlike Title VII of the Civil Rights Act (a workplace law protecting employees from
discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, and national origin), IRCA’s protection
reaches employers with fewer than fifteen employees and explicitly includes citizenship status
as a protected class.  8 U.S.C. § 1324b(a)(2)(A) (2006) (exempting only employers with three
or fewer employees).
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ate incentives for employers to “play it safe” by making employment
decisions based on such things as national origin, ethnicity, race, or ac-
cent.28  To enforce IRCA’s employment discrimination protections, Con-
gress created a new federal agency.29  In these ways, employees gained
additional workplace protections through a change in immigration law.30
IRCA’s main enforcement measures illustrate another way that im-
migration enforcement has permeated the workplace since 1986.  Em-
ployer audits, workplace raids, and workplace arrests have consistently
been the centerpieces of workplace-based immigration enforcement since
IRCA’s enactment.  Nonetheless, the frequency of the federal govern-
ment’s use of each type of immployment enforcement measure has
shifted over time and presidential administrations.31
In recent years, for example, federal immigration authorities have
intensified IRCA enforcement measures that target employers at the
same time that they have reduced their reliance on workplace immigra-
tion raids that target employees.32  Over the last few years, the number of
employer audits has risen substantially.33  As Table 3 shows, the number
of employers audited by federal immigration authorities increased from
28 Griffith, supra note 24, at 1147.
29 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(c) (2006).
30 For another example of workplace protections that come from immigration law, see
Leticia M. Saucedo, A New “U”: Organizing Victims and Protecting Immigrant Workers, 42
U. RICH. L. REV. 891, 952–53 (2008) (describing use of “U” immigration visas to protect
victims of workplace law violations).
31 See ANDORRA BRUNO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 40002, IMMIGRATION-RELATED
WORKSITE ENFORCEMENT: PERFORMANCE MEASURES 2–4 (2010) (“The federal government’s
approach to immigration-related worksite enforcement has changed over the years.”). See also
Julia Preston, Illegal Workers Swept from Jobs in ‘Silent Raids’, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 2010, at
A1 (reporting that “ICE is looking primarily for ‘egregious employers’ who commit both labor
abuses and immigration violations”).
32 See Amber McKinney, Napolitano Says DHS Has Made Smart, Effective Immigration
Enforcement Changes, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 193, at A-18 (Oct. 5, 2011) (quoting De-
partment of Homeland Security Secretary’s statement that the federal government has “fo-
cused targeted worksite enforcement programs like I-9 audits and criminal prosecutions of
employers who egregiously violate employment laws” rather than workplace raids); Adriana
Gardella, As Immigration Audits Increase, Some Employers Pay a High Price, N.Y. TIMES,
Jul. 14, 2011 (“While the administration of George W. Bush focused on headline-making raids
that resulted in arrests of immigrant workers, the Obama administration has gone after employ-
ers with ICE’s I-9 audits on the theory that employers who hire unauthorized workers create
the demand that drives most illegal immigration.”).
33 For critiques of this trend, see Miriam Jordan, ‘Silent Raids’ Squeeze Illegal Workers;
Critics on Right and Left Fault Obama’s Pressure on Employers for Fostering Underground
Economy, WALL ST. J., Mar. 29, 2011, at A6 (“[I]t has become increasingly clear that the
policy [of audits] is pushing undocumented workers deeper underground, delivering them to
the hands of unscrupulous employers, depressing wages and depriving federal, state and local
coffers of taxes, according to unions, companies and immigrant advocates.”); David Bacon &
Bill Ong Hing, The Rise and Fall of Employer Sanctions, 38 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 77, 79 (2010)
(stating that “the end result” of audits is that “workers lose their jobs” and noting that the
employer sanctions “pretend to publish employers, but in reality, they punish workers.”).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CJP\21-3\CJP301.txt unknown Seq: 10 10-APR-12 9:35
620 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 21:611
254 in 2007 to 2,496 for the first ten months of 2011.  Similarly, as a
result of IRCA enforcement in 2011, the federal government debarred
115 individuals and 97 businesses from the opportunity to contract with
the federal government.34  In 2008, workplace-based immigration en-
forcement measures did not result in any debarments from federal
contracts.35
TABLE 3: WORKSITE IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT AUDITS**
Number of
Employer AuditsYear
2542007
503
1444
2196
2496
2008
2009
2010
2011*
* As of November 4, 2011.
** ICE Data Show Immigration Audits Up, [Sept.] Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No.
180, at A-11 (9/20/2010); ICE to Conduct Audits of 1,000 Employers, [Feb.]
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 36, at A-2 (2/24/2011); Miriam Jordan, Immigration
Audits Drive Illegal Workers Underground, WALL ST. J., Aug. 15, 2011, http://
online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111904480904576496200011699920.
html; News Release, United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement
Agency, Several major US employers join ICE employment compliance pro-
gram, ICE News (Nov. 4, 2011), available at http://www.ice.gov/news/releases/
1111/111104washingtondc.htm.
In contrast to its heightened enforcement focus on employers, the
federal government has recently downplayed workplace-based immigra-
tion enforcement measures that target employees.  Homeland Security
Secretary Janet Napolitano, for instance, recently stated that workplace
immigration raids “made no sense” as an immigration enforcement strat-
egy.36  According to Napolitano, while federal immigration authorities
expended considerable time and resources to conduct large-scale work-
place immigration raids during the Bush administration, too many law-
breaking employers were left unpunished and “criminal aliens were free
to roam our streets.”37  As a result of this reduction in workplace immi-
gration raids, the total number of arrests that result from the federal gov-
34 News Release, ICE, Several major US employers join ICE employment compliance
program (Nov. 4, 2011), available at http://www.ice.gov/news/releases/1111/111104wash-
ingtondc.htm.
35 Id.
36 McKinney, supra note 32.
37 Id.
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ernment’s workplace-based immigration efforts has decreased.  Table 4
illustrates this trend.
TABLE 4: WORKSITE IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT ARRESTS*
* For 2002–08 data, see Fact Sheet, United States Immigration and Customs Enforce-
ment Agency, Worksite Enforcement Overview (Apr. 30, 2009, http://www.ice.gov/
news/library/factsheets/worksite.htm. For 2009–10 data, see ANDORRA BRUNO, CON-
GRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, IMMIGRATION-RELATED WORKSITE ENFORCEMENT
MEASURES 7, tb. 3 (2011), available at http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/R40002_201103
01.pdf.
Federal agencies have acknowledged the interaction between work-
place-based immigration enforcement and employees’ workplace protec-
tions to some extent.  The Obama administration’s “Comprehensive
Worksite Strategy,” for instance, proclaims that it “promotes national se-
curity, protects critical infrastructure and targets employers who violate
employment laws or engage in abuse or exploitation of workers.”38
Coordination between immigration authorities and the U.S. Depart-
ment of Labor (DOL) similarly illustrates a kind of immployment law
enforcement strategy.  Namely, the two agencies have stated that they
would like to better coordinate their efforts in order to reduce immigra-
tion law’s negative effects on workplace protections.  For example, the
38 Worksite Enforcement, U.S. Immigration. & Customs Enforcement, available at http:/
/www.ice .gov/worksite/ (last visited Jan. 17, 2012) (emphasis added).
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DOL has coordinated with federal immigration authorities to obtain “U”
visas for undocumented workers who are victims of workplace crimes.39
Moreover, the DOL and the U.S. Immigration and Customs En-
forcement agency (ICE) recently co-signed a Memorandum of Under-
standing (MOU), which states that immigration authorities will not
misrepresent themselves to workers as DOL agents and will refrain from
worksite immigration enforcement when there is an ongoing DOL inves-
tigation at that worksite.40  Among other things, the MOU states that
immigration authorities will be cautious of “tips and leads” which “are
motivated by an improper desire to manipulate a pending labor dispute,
retaliate against employees for exercising labor rights, or otherwise frus-
trate the enforcement of labor laws.”41  Similarly, the MOU clarifies that
the DOL will have a chance to interview undocumented workers who are
detained as a result of workplace-based immigration enforcement mea-
sures but who may have suffered workplace law abuses.42
As this Part illustrated, since 1986, the federal government has en-
deavored to restrict unauthorized immigration by regulating the employ-
ment relationship (employers in particular) and the workplace more
broadly.  IRCA’s status as a legal hybrid challenges the traditional sepa-
ration between immigration and workplace law.  As the next Part will
elaborate upon, a similar legislative trend has recently appeared at the
state and local levels as well.
IV. SUBFEDERAL WORKPLACE-BASED IMMIGRATION LAW
While changes to federal immigration law in 1986 and subsequent
enforcement actions have intertwined immigration and employees’ work-
place protections in crucial ways, recent dynamics at the state and local
39 See Saucedo, supra note 4, at 315 (stating that immigration “regulations specifically
mention the EEOC and the DOL among the authorized certifiers for U visas”).  The DOL has
also issued guidance about its role in “U” visa enforcement. See Department of Labor U Visa
Process and Protocols Question – Answer (April 28, 2011), available at http://www.dol.gov/
opa/media/press/whd/whd20110619-qa.pdf.
40 See Revised Memorandum of Understanding Between U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec.
and U.S. Dep’t of Labor 1 (Mar. 31, 2011), available at http://www.dol.gov/_sec/media/re-
ports/HispanicLaborForce/dhs-dol-mou.pdf. [hereinafter Revised Memorandum]; Gayle Cin-
quegrani, Collaboration Is the Watchword at the Labor Department, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA)
No. 15 at S-10 (Jan. 24, 2012) (stating that the US Solicitor of Labor “is brokering formal
collaboration agreements between the Labor Department and the Department of Homeland
Security to prevent the two departments from “stepping on each other’s toes” while conducting
their respective enforcement activities at work sites.”).  For another federal agency’s attempt to
reduce conflict between immigration and workplace policy, see Memorandum from Richard
A. Siegel, Assoc. Gen. Counsel, Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. to all Regional Directors, Officers
in Charge, and Resident Officers of the NLRB (June 7, 2011), available at http://www.ilw.
com/immigrationdaily/news/2011,0609-nlrb.pdf.
41 Revised Memorandum, supra note 40.
42 Id.
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levels have extended the scope and have further complicated the immp-
loyment law story. Specifically, state and local (subfederal) governments
have recently enacted a number of laws that regulate immigration via the
workplace.  While it has some historical predecessors, this trend largely
began to reemerge in 2005.43  In that year, as Table 5 represents, five
states passed immigration laws that regulated the workplace in some way
(employment-related immigration laws).  The pace of subfederal activity
in this area has continued to rise swiftly.  For instance, in 2011, seven-
teen states as well as Puerto Rico passed twenty-seven employment-re-
lated immigration laws.  If we consider the number of bills introduced,
rather than enacted, the numbers are even more striking.  In the first
TABLE 5: SUBFEDERAL EMPLOYMENT-RELATED IMMIGRATION LAWS**
* Includes Puerto Rico.
** NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, STATE LAWS RELATED TO IMMI-
GRATION AND IMMIGRANTS, 2005–2011 (2011), available at http://www.ncsl.org/
default.aspx?tabid=19897; NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, 2011
IMMIGRATION-RELATED LAWS AND RESOLUTIONS IN THE STATES, (2011), available at
http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?TabId=23960.
43 While this surge is new, there was an increase in subfederal employment-related im-
migration laws in the 1970s which died down after IRCA’s enactment. See Griffith, supra
note 2, at 395–97 (stating that “approximately twelve states and local authorities passed some
form of employer-sanctions law” but that these were directly preempted by IRCA in 1986).
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quarter of 2011, forty-four states proposed a total of 279 employment-
related immigration bills.44
While these subfederal laws could be generally characterized as
“mini IRCAs” because they are immigration regulations that target the
workplace, there are relevant distinctions between federal and subfederal
employment-related immigration requirements.  Subfederal laws often
contain requirements and penalties that go beyond federal requirements.
For instance, as of November 2011, at least eight states had required
private employers to use the electronic E-Verify system to check em-
ployees’ work authorization.45  Because the use of E-Verify is not
mandatory at the federal level, these subfederal verification requirements
surpass IRCA.
Moreover, a handful of states allow documented employees to bring
court actions against their prospective or former employers because of
the employers’ alleged use of undocumented labor.46  Some of these law-
suits can result in monetary damages against employers.47  Under IRCA,
these kinds of private rights of action are not available.  Some states have
even criminalized an undocumented employee’s act of working or solic-
iting work.48  IRCA, as described above, does not make it illegal for an
employee to work or to look for work.49
Also unlike IRCA, subfederal employment-related immigration
laws do not include enhancements in funding for wage and hour enforce-
ment or specific employment discrimination protections that are compa-
rable to IRCA’s protections.50  Furthermore, unlike the federal MOU
between ICE and DOL, there are no reported agency efforts to coordinate
subfederal immigration and labor enforcement in ways that minimize im-
migration enforcement’s impact on employees’ workplace protections.
44 NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, 2011 IMMIGRATION-RELATED
LAWS, BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS IN THE STATES, (Jan. 1–Mar. 31, 2011), available at http://
www.ncsl.org/issues-research/immig/immigration-laws-and-bills-spring-2011.aspx.
45 See Ann Morse, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, E-VERIFY FAQ, avail-
able at http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?TabId=13127 (Nov. 4, 2011).
46 See, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 71-11-3(4)(d) (2011); MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-305(3)
(2009); S.C. CODE ANN. § 41-1-30(A) (2011); UTAH CODE ANN. § 63G-12-302(4)(a), (c)
(2011).  A district court recently issued a temporary injunction against Alabama’s private right
of action provision. See United States v. Alabama, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112362, at 9,
144–55 (N. D. Ala. Sept. 28, 2011).
47 See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 41-1-30(d)(1)–(3) (2011).  For an argument that these
provisions are preempted because of their conflicts with federal employment laws, see Griffith,
supra note 2, at 411–41.
48 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 31-13-11(a) (2011) (“It is unlawful for a person who is an
unauthorized alien to knowingly apply for work, solicit work in a public or private place, or
perform work as an employee or independent contractor in this state.”).
49 See 8 U.S.C. § 1324c(a) (2006).
50 See Griffith, supra note 2, at 417–27 (identifying this as one way that subfederal
employment-related immigration laws are in conflict with federal employment protections).
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The emergence of immigration regulatory initiatives at both the fed-
eral and subfederal levels, which target the employer-employee relation-
ship and the workplace more broadly, has blurred the traditional
boundaries between immigration and workplace law.  To fully under-
stand the immployment law trend at the subfederal level, scholars should
continue to categorize and define the quickly shifting contours of sub-
federal employment-related immigration laws.51  While the National
Conference of State Legislatures regularly tracks the passage and enact-
ment of immigration legislation at the state level,52 there is no compara-
ble systematic data on the many immigration laws passed at the local
level each year by counties and cities.  Moreover, given the scope of this
trend, scholars should investigate why subfederal governments have leg-
islated in the immployment law area since 2005 and what can account for
variation across the states.53
V. IMMPLOYMENT LAW ANALYSIS IN THE COURTS
Federal and state courts have increasingly considered both immigra-
tion and workplace policy goals within the same cases.  To resolve an
immigration law legal dispute, or to resolve a workplace law legal con-
troversy, some courts have simultaneously considered the policies under-
lying immigration and workplace law.  In other words, even though the
original dispute specifically involved only one area of law, the courts
jointly considered both areas of law when they made their determina-
tions.  Their concurrent consideration of these otherwise distinct areas of
law affirms the emergence of immployment law analyses in practice.
The U.S. Supreme Court’s 1984 Sure-Tan v. NLRB decision marks
the first major contemporary development in immployment law analy-
sis.54  While Sure-Tan involved questions arising solely from the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act (NLRA), the Court considered both
immigration and NLRA policy goals to resolve the NLRA questions.
51 For a recent book on some of the key emerging trends in this area, see TAKING LOCAL
CONTROL: IMMIGRATION POLICY ACTIVISM IN U.S. CITIES AND STATES (Monica W. Varsanyi
ed., 2010).
52 See generally NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, Immigration, available at
http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research.aspx?tabs=951,119,851.
53 While it does not focus on employment-related immigration provisions in particular,
there is a growing body of scholarship that is examining the origins of subfederal immigration
laws more generally. See Katharine M. Donato & Amada Armenta, What We Know About
Unauthorized Migration 37 ANN. REV. SOC. 529, 534 (2011) (“[S]tudies suggest that subna-
tional and restrictionist antiimmigrant policies are more likely to emerge in Republican areas
. . . [and] find[ ] that local anti-immigrant policies are most likely in communities that exper-
ienced a sudden growth in the immigrant population and when national rhetoric about immi-
gration is most salient and threatening.”). See generally TAKING LOCAL CONTROL:
IMMIGRATION POLICY ACTIVISM IN U.S. CITIES AND STATES (Monica W. Varsanyi ed., 2010).
54 Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883 (1984).
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Among other things, the Court was asked whether an undocumented
worker who fell within the formal definition of an NLRA “employee”
lost his NLRA collective action rights because of his immigration status.
The Sure-Tan Court ultimately concluded that undocumented employees
enjoy the same NLRA collective action rights as documented
employees.55
To justify this conclusion, the Sure-Tan Court drew upon both
workplace law and immigration law policy goals.  With respect to NLRA
policy, the Court reasoned that excluding undocumented employees from
NLRA rights would foster “a subclass of workers without a comparable
stake in the collective goals of their legally resident co-workers, thereby
eroding the unity of all the employees and impeding effective collective
bargaining.”56  In turn, the Sure-Tan Court reasoned that its conclusion
bolstered immigration policy goals as well, stating that providing the un-
documented with NLRA rights would “lessen” employers’ “incentive to
hire” undocumented workers.57
Immployment law analyses in the courts have intensified since Con-
gress enacted IRCA in 1986, and especially since the U.S. Supreme
Court decided Hoffman Plastic Compounds v. NLRB in 2002.  In Hoff-
man, the Supreme Court considered the policies underlying both the
NLRA and IRCA to conclude that an undocumented employee could not
have access to NLRA backpay to remedy an NLRA violation.58 Thus,
while the undocumented employee had the NLRA right to engage in col-
lective activity without employer interference, he could not receive
backpay to remedy the employer’s violation of this right.59  According to
the Hoffman Court, providing backpay to this employee would “en-
courage the successful evasion of apprehension by immigration authori-
ties, condone prior violations of the immigration laws, and encourage
future violations.”60  The Hoffman Court also considered the workplace
law consequences of its decision to some extent, concluding that the
NLRA had other ways (besides backpay) to remedy NLRA violations
against undocumented employees.61
The doctrinal analysis of the four dissenting justices in Hoffman can
be similarly characterized as immployment law analysis.62  The dissent-
55 Id. at 891–92.
56 Id. at 892.
57 Id. at 893–94.
58 Hoffman Plastic Compounds, 535 U.S. at 144–49, 151–52 (2002).
59 Id.
60 Id. at 151.
61 The remaining remedies were a cease and desist order and an order that the employer
post a notice about the NLRA violation at his workplace. Id. at 152.
62 See id. at 155 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (stating that the denial of backpay to undocu-
mented employees “lowers the cost to the employer of an initial labor law violation” and
“thereby increases the employer’s incentive to find and to hire illegal-alien employees.”).
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ing justices’ simultaneous consideration of immigration and NLRA pol-
icy concerns, however, led them to a diametrically opposed conclusion
about how to solve the NLRA backpay question.  For the dissenters,
granting backpay to an undocumented employee would help, not hurt,
immigration policy goals by making these employees less attractive to
employers in the future.  According to these justices, despite the availa-
bility of the remaining NLRA remedies of notice posting and a cease-
and-desist order, failing to provide backpay to undocumented employees
would severely impede the NLRA’s ability to deter employers from tak-
ing adverse employment actions against employees who engage in col-
lective activity at the workplace.63
Since the Court’s 2002 Hoffman decision, the agency in charge of
NLRA enforcement (National Labor Relations Board—NLRB) and
lower courts have been increasingly engaged in immployment law analy-
ses.  Because an employee’s immigration status is clearly relevant to
whether an undocumented employee can receive a backpay remedy in an
NLRA case, the NLRB often must make an immigration law assessment
about an individual’s immigration status as part of its labor law decision
about NLRA remedies.64  In a recent NLRB decision, however, the
NLRB limited the circumstances under which an employer can raise im-
migration status as a defense to an NLRA backpay remedy.  In Flaum
Appetizing Corp., the NLRB concluded that employers must have a suffi-
cient “factual basis” for contending that their employees lack proper im-
migration status.65
Hoffman’s reliance on immigration policy considerations in an
NLRA case not only raised a host of procedural and substantive ques-
tions related to the NLRB’s enforcement of the NLRA.  It also opened up
a series of questions about how immigration law may affect workplace
law controversies not involving the NLRA.  The ways that these lower
courts have weighed immigration goals on the one hand and workplace
policy goals on the other have varied significantly across courts.66  In-
deed, post-Hoffman, there is widespread legal ambiguity (and therefore
ongoing litigation) about which workplace law remedies are available to
63 See id. at 154 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Without the possibility of the deterrence that
backpay provides, the Board can impose only future-oriented obligations upon law-violating
employers—for it has no other weapons in its remedial arsenal.  And in the absence of the
backpay weapon, employers could conclude that they can violate the labor laws at least once
with impunity.”).
64 The NLRB recently concluded that an undocumented employee cannot receive
backpay even if the employer violates IRCA and the employee does not. See Mezonos Maven
Bakery, Inc. 357 NLRB No. 47 (2011).
65 See Flaum Appetizing Corp., 357 NLRB No. 162 (2011).
66 See generally Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, Redefining the Rights of Undocumented
Workers, 58 AM. U. L. REV. 1361 (2009).
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undocumented employees who are victims of federal and state workplace
law violations.67
Courts, however, have not solely applied immployment law analyses
to resolve workplace law disputes.  A few courts have utilized a form of
immployment law analysis in immigration law disputes as well.  An im-
migration judge in New York, for example, considered immigration and
workplace law concerns when he ruled to suppress evidence against im-
migrants who were in deportation proceedings.  The evidence had been
obtained as a result of a worksite immigration raid.  To make the eviden-
tiary ruling, the immigration judge considered the effects of an “Opera-
tion Instruction” (OI) for immigration authorities, which had directed
them to take certain precautions when there is an ongoing labor dispute
at a particular establishment that they would like to target for immigra-
tion enforcement.68  These precautions, according to the judge, are in-
tended to protect the immigrant employees’ “rights under federal labor
law.”69  Thus, the immigration judge suppressed evidence against these
individuals because immigration authorities had relied on a tip from an
employer during an ongoing labor dispute and had failed to follow the
OI.70
Immployment law analysis also has played a limited role in some of
the ongoing Constitutional challenges to the subfederal immigration laws
described above.  The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Cir-
cuit, for instance, considered both immigration and employment policies
to determine whether Hazleton, Pennsylvania’s employment-related im-
migration law was constitutional.  Because Hazleton’s subfederal law in-
cluded burdens on employers that went beyond the burdens that IRCA
created, the Third Circuit concluded that it was in conflict with IRCA’s
intent to reduce an employer’s incentive to engage in employment
discrimination.71
In contrast, the Supreme Court’s recent Chamber of Commerce vs.
Whiting case concluded that Arizona’s employment-related immigration
67 See id. at 1372 (“[W]hat I call an ‘ambiguous rights’ scenario, reflects the current,
muddled state of affairs.  Because employers have experienced limited success in their at-
tempts to extend remedial limitations in labor law to other employment laws . . .  unauthorized
immigrants do not know which claims remain viable.”).
68 See In re Herrera-Priego, Decision and Order of the Immigration Judge 22-24 (July 10,
2003), available at http://v2011.nilc.org/immsemplymnt/IWR_Material/Attorney/attorney_
index.htm. But see Monteso v. INS, 124 F.3d 385 n.4 (2d Cir. 1997).
69 Herrera-Priego at 23.
70 Id. at 22–24.
71 See Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 620 F.3d 170, 211–12 (3d Cir. 2010).  This case was
vacated and remanded in light of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Chamber of Commerce
v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968 (2011).  For a reference to IRCA’s immployment law qualities, see
Chamber of Commerce v. Edmondson, 594 F.3d 742, 767 (10th Cir. 2010) (describing IRCA’s
main goals as “preventing the hiring of unauthorized aliens, lessening the disruption of Ameri-
can business, and minimizing the possibility of employment discrimination”).
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provisions (a licensing provision and mandatory E-Verify requirement
for all employers) were not in conflict with IRCA’s protections against
employment discrimination.72  Because Arizona’s employment-related
immigration law provisions differ markedly from Hazleton’s provisions
and the patchwork of subfederal provisions in other parts of the country,
it is difficult to predict what effect, if any, Whiting will have on the Third
Circuit’s and other lower courts’ applications of immployment law
analysis.
In sum, the growing use of immployment law analysis in the courts
is an additional reason to explore the intersections between immigration
and workplace law.  The courts’ inconsistent use of immployment law
analyses in cases involving Hoffman’s legacy and the constitutionality of
subfederal immigration laws also calls for intensive scholarly, judicial,
and legislative attention.  For instance, scholars, courts, and policymak-
ers, should develop comprehensive immployment law frameworks that
can resolve ongoing legal ambiguity about the workplace law remedies
available to undocumented workers.
Additionally, scholars and courts should more aggressively and con-
sistently apply immployment law analyses to resolve ongoing questions
about the constitutionality of a wide array of subfederal employment-
related immigration laws.  To date, Supremacy Clause preemption analy-
ses have largely focused on whether subfederal employment-related pro-
tections conflict with federal immigration law, neglecting potential
conflicts involving federal employment policy goals.  As I have argued
previously, subfederal employment-related immigration laws conflict
with federal employment protections in a number of ways.73
VI. IMMIGRATION LAW’S EFFECTS ON WORKPLACE PROTECTIONS
Another reason to consider immigration and workplace policies to-
gether is that immigration law may affect employees’ workplace protec-
tions and collective activity in a number of ways.  In accordance with
Congressional intent, sometimes immigration law enhances, or comple-
72 Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1971–72 (2011) (stating that
employment discrimination is not an issue because “[l]icense termination is not an available
sanction for merely hiring unauthorized workers, but is triggered only by far more egregious
violations.  And because the Arizona law covers only knowing or intentional violations, an
employer acting in good faith need not fear the law’s sanctions.  Moreover, federal and state
antidiscrimination laws protect against employment discrimination and provide employers
with a strong incentive not to discriminate.  Employers also enjoy safe harbors from liability
when using E-Verify as required by the Arizona law.  The most rational path for employers is
to obey both the law barring the employment of unauthorized aliens and the law prohibiting
discrimination.”).
73 See Griffith, supra note 2, at 393 (developing a preemption framework that both con-
siders the preemptive force of FLSA and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and “simultaneously
considers the policy goals of federal immigration law and federal employment law.”).
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ments, employees’ workplace protections.  Part III’s description of
IRCA’s civil rights protections for employees who experience national
origin or citizenship status discrimination in the workplace serves as one
example.74
Recent case law and scholarship, however, illustrate that all too
often immigration policies have had a negative effect on employees’
workplace protections and collective activity in practice.  The Court’s
Hoffman Plastics decision and its progeny, discussed in Part V, demon-
strates that judicial consideration of immigration policies has heightened
legal ambiguity and has sometimes lead to a reduction in the workplace
law remedies available to undocumented workers.  Scholars have argued
that Hoffman’s negative effects go beyond the court rulings that follow in
its wake.  As Professor Ruben Garcia’s Essay in this issue contends,
Hoffman stands as “a powerful legal symbol,” which emboldens unscru-
pulous employers and “sends a message of exclusion to undocumented
workers, and by extension, to many immigrant workers in society.”75
Restrictive aspects of immigration law may be in tension with the
incentives that Congress intended workplace law to promote and thereby
have negative effects on employee protections.76  The fostering of incen-
tives is essential to effective workplace regulation.  As Professor Adam
Cox has stated, “[l]aw pervasively regulates behavior by generating in-
centives” rather than “solely through the direct exertion of coercive
force.”77  Numerous scholars have argued that restrictive immigration
policies have reduced immigrant employees’ willingness to come for-
ward to complain about workplace law violations, even in the face of the
most severe violations.78  Professors Janice Fine and Jennifer Gordon,
74 For another example of how the interaction between immigration law and workplace
law can expand employees’ workplace protections see Kati L. Griffith & Tamara L. Lee,
Immigration Advocacy as Labor Advocacy, 33 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. (forthcoming
2012) (contending that the NLRA protects many forms of employees’ collective immigration
advocacy because of the close relationship between immigration and labor concerns).
75 Ruben J. Garcia, Ten Years after Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. vs. NLRB: The
Power of a Labor Law Symbol, 21 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y, 659, 662. See also id. at 3
(“The fact that Hoffman might apply to a more limited number of cases than originally feared,
or only to the remedy of back pay for all immigrants, does not make it less of a threat to the
labor rights of all immigrants.  The specter of Hoffman has sometimes been used more effec-
tively than the reality; employers have tried to use Hoffman to seek discovery of immigration
status in depositions and to deny workers’ compensation in some cases.”).
76 For extensive legislative history examples of Congress’s intent to avoid conflict be-
tween immigration and workplace law, see Griffith, supra note 24, at 1144–54.  Incentives
play an important role in legal analysis.
77 Adam B. Cox, Immigration Law’s Organizing Principles, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 341, 387
(2008).
78 See Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, Fear of Discovery: Immigrant Workers and the
Fifth Amendment, 41 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 27, 44 (2008) (“Unauthorized immigrants are
acutely aware of their tenuous presence in the United States . . . [they] often chose to remain
silent in the face of egregious workplace violations.”); Griffith, supra note 2, at 437 n.228
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for example, recently contended that “immigrants [are] increasingly un-
willing to come forward to report wage violations” because of “work site
raids and employer sanctions enforcement.”79
Immigrant workers’ failure to seek government intervention when
they are experiencing workplace law abuses is particularly problematic
from a workplace law perspective.  The U.S. workplace law enforcement
scheme promotes and largely relies on the initiative of employees, rather
than government inspections, to maintain baseline workplace protections
for employees.80  In this way, workplace law contains what some politi-
cal scientists have referred to in other contexts as a “fire-alarm over-
sight” scheme, which depends on employee initiative.  This is in contrast
to “police-patrol oversight” schemes, which would involve such things as
widespread government inspections and would operate regardless of em-
ployee initiative.81  Thus, workplace law enforcement is severely com-
promised when employees do not have the proper incentive to fulfill
their intended role as private attorneys general who will pull the work-
place law fire alarm when necessary.82
Scholars have shown that immigration policy not only narrows
workplace protections but also impedes collective activity among em-
ployees.  The modest empirical evidence that exists on employers’ retali-
atory actions, for instance, suggests that some employers do indeed
threaten employees with immigration law consequences if they engage in
collective activity or step forward to make workplace law complaints.83
For instance, the three-city survey of low-wage workers, described in
(2011) (collecting authority on this issue).  This may vary to some extent depending on
whether collective activity is present and which workplace law is at issue.  Professor Benjamin
Sachs, for example, has argued that the exclusion of undocumented workers from key NLRA
remedies has had “a hydraulic effect,” such that organized immigrant workers have turned to
employment law, rather than labor law, as a way to protect their collective activity.  Benjamin
I. Sachs, Employment Law as Labor Law, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 2685, 2687 (2008).
79 Janice Fine & Jennifer Gordon, Strengthening Labor Standards Enforcement Through
Partnerships with Workers’ Organizations, 38 POL. & SOC’Y 552, 555 (2010).
80 See Griffith, supra note 2, at 431–36 (using statutory text, legislative history and Su-
preme Court precedent to illustrate that private attorneys general are the cornerstone of the
enforcement schemes of FLSA and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTA-
BILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-962T, FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT: BETTER USE OF AVAILABLE RE-
SOURCES AND CONSISTENT REPORTING COULD IMPROVE COMPLIANCE 7 (2008), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08962t.pdf (estimating that employee-initiated complaints are
responsible for three-fourths of DOL’s investigations).
81 The fire alarm and police patrol concepts were originally developed in the context of
Congressional oversight. See Mathew D. Cummins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Over-
sight Overlooked: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. OF POL. SCIENCE 165, 166
(1984).
82 See Griffith, supra note 2, at 431–36.
83 See Lee, supra note 4, at 1107 (citing and discussing “growing anecdotal evidence” on
this issue); see also Michael J. Wishnie, Immigrants and the Right To Petition, 78 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 667, 667–80 (2003).
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Part II, found that some employers use threats to call immigration author-
ities as a way to intimidate employees who engage in union organizing
efforts or who file workplace law complaints against their employers.84
Of the workers who were retaliated against by their employers because
they had filed a workplace law complaint or participated in union or-
ganizing efforts, 47.1% were subject to employer threats that they would
fire employees or call immigration authorities.85
Scholars and commentators have also identified ways that the
agency in charge of workplace-based immigration enforcement, the U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement agency (ICE), has impeded
workplace law enforcement and employee organizing in some circum-
stances.  ICE agents, for instance, have misrepresented themselves to
workers as employee health and safety agents in order to capture undocu-
mented workers.86  On other occasions, ICE has reportedly initiated
workplace immigration raids in response to “tips” from employers who
contact immigration authorities as a way of deterring employee organiz-
ing and workplace law claims.87
Moreover, the National Employment Law Project recently reported
on three cases that involved “ICE surveillance of picket lines or other
labor activities” and four cases that involved immigration enforcement
activities at workplaces despite “ICE knowledge of an ongoing organiz-
ing campaign or labor dispute.”88  Therefore, despite the DOL-ICE
Memorandum of Understanding described in Part III, ICE’s interventions
have sometimes sent the message to employees that labor disputes bring
about immigration enforcement and that undocumented employees are
84 BERNHARDT, supra note 12, at 3, 24–25.
85 See id. at 24–25.  A study of campaigns related to NLRB-supervised union elections
found that “[i]n 7% of all campaigns—but 50% of campaigns with a majority of undocu-
mented workers and 41% with a majority of recent immigrants—employers make threats of
referral to Immigration Customs and Enforcement (ICE).” See KATE BRONFENBRENNER,
ECON. POLICY INST., NO HOLDS BARRED: THE INTENSIFICATION OF EMPLOYER OPPOSITION TO
ORGANIZING 12 (2009), available at http://epi.3cdn.net/edc3b3dc172dd1094f_0ym6ii96d.pdf;
see also LANCE COMPA, UNFAIR ADVANTAGE: WORKERS’ FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION IN THE
UNITED STATES UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARDS 30 (2004) (describing
threats by employers to call immigration authorities in response to union organizing efforts).
86 See Lee, supra note 1, at 1092.
87 See id.  For a description of five additional cases involving “ICE enforcement actions
undertaken at the behest of employers, their surrogates, and other police agencies” see Nat’l
Emp’t Law Project, ICED OUT: How Immigration Enforcement Has Interfered with Workers’
Rights 15–21 (2009), available at http://nelp.3cdn.net/75a43e6ae48f67216a_w2m6bp1ak.pdf.
See also Gayle Cinquegrani, Collaboration Is the Watchword at the Labor Department, Daily
Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 15 at S-10 (Jan. 24, 2012) (reporting on the Labor Solicitor’s comment
that the DOL has “seen instances where employers threaten to call ICE” as a response to a
DOL investigation.”).
88 See Nat’l Emp’t Law Project, ICED OUT: How Immigration Enforcement Has Inter-
fered with Workers’ Rights 21–27 (2009), available at http://nelp.3cdn.net/75a43e6ae48f
67216a_w2m6bp1ak.pdf.
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not safe to organize or to come forward with complaints related to their
workplace rights.89
Regardless of whether employers actually make immigration threats
as a response to employees’ workplace law complaints and regardless of
whether ICE actually intervenes in a specific workplace, immigration
law may still be in tension with collective activity and a workplace law
enforcement scheme that relies on employee-led complaints.90  As one
scholar adeptly states, “[e]ven second-hand experiences, those that come
to the employee via organizational networks, can have the effect of push-
ing unauthorized immigrants deeper into the margins of society.”91
Moreover, a 2008 survey of Latino immigrants in North Carolina illus-
trates that “rumors” about immigration enforcement measures can chill
immigrant employees’ claimsmaking.92  Thus, even though the total
number of worksite enforcement measures currently hovers below 3,500
per year,93 the effects of these measures can be amplified through news
and rumors that travel via immigrant networks.
Even when specific employer threats, immigration enforcement ac-
tions, and rumors are not present, immigration law continues to be in
tension with employees’ collective activity and the enforcement of em-
ployees’ workplace protections.  Professors Leticia Saucedo and Cristina
Morales have convincingly argued, for instance, that a worker’s immi-
gration status serves as a formidable disincentive to engage in worker
organizing efforts or to come forward when that worker experiences
wage, safety or some other kind of workplace law violation.  As their co-
authored Essay in this issue contends, undocumented workers cannot ad-
equately effectuate their private attorneys general role within our work-
place law enforcement scheme if they “feel they have no rights or
protection in the workplace.”94
89 See Lee, supra note 1, at 1092.
90 See Rivera v. NIBCO, Inc., 364 F.3d 1057, 1064–66 (9th Cir. 2004) (contending that
both documented and undocumented immigrant workers may fear coming forward with work-
place law complaints because they do not want to risk immigration law consequences for
themselves or for their friends and families).
91 Lee, supra note 1, at 1105.
92 See Michael Jones-Correa, Gov’t Dep’t, Cornell Univ. and Katherine Fennelly, Hubert
Humphrey Inst. of Pub. Affairs, Univ. of Minn., Immigration Enforcement and Its Effects on
Latino Lives in Two Rural North Carolina Communities, Conference on “Undocumented His-
panic Migration: On the Margins of a Dream,” Conn. Coll. (Oct. 16–18, 2009) (“The survey
indicates that fear itself has a negative consequence on immigrant life, and the interviews
indicate that rumors of immigration enforcement can have negative effects as real as the en-
forcement itself.”).
93 See News Release, ICE, Several major US employers join ICE employment compli-
ance program (Nov. 4, 2011), available at http://www.ice.gov/news/releases/1111/
111104washingtondc.htm (reporting 3,291 work site enforcement actions as of November
2011).
94 Leticia M. Saucedo and M. Cristina Morales, Voices Without Law: The Border Cross-
ing Stories and Workplace Attitudes of Immigrants, 21 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 641, 657.
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The Saucedo and Morales study, which is based on over 100 inter-
views with workers in Las Vegas, Nevada and Hidalgo, Mexico, shows
that undocumented people often view their workplace rights through the
prism of their experience as undocumented immigrants and, therefore,
their experience of having few rights.95  The study illustrates that immi-
grant narratives about their experiences crossing the U.S.–Mexico border
are similar to immigrant narratives about their experiences in the work-
place.  Both of these narratives, according to Saucedo and Morales, are
“rooted in masculinity,” encouraging immigrants to endure “increasingly
greater risks” with border crossings and to “tolerate difficult conditions
in the workplace.”96
This Part’s description of potential tensions between immigration
and workplace law demonstrates the need for future research which con-
siders immigration policy in relationship to workplace policy.  More em-
pirical work is necessary is this area.  Professor Garcia’s Essay, for
instance, implores scholars to engage in “empirical work  . . .  to measure
the impact of Hoffman on union organizing.”97  Moreover, scholars
should empirically examine what can explain the correlation between im-
migration status and a higher prevalence of workplace law violations de-
scribed in Part II.
Professor Jayesh Rathod reminds us that understanding what moti-
vates or deters low-wage and immigrant workers is a crucial area of in-
quiry moving forward.  Rathod encourages scholars to conduct empirical
research which considers immigration status as just one of multiple fac-
tors that influence a worker’s actions or inactions. 98  Rathod effectively
contends that “the emphasis on status to the exclusion of other factors
contributes to an incomplete understanding of immigrant worker behav-
ior and obscures the rich interplay between immigration status, other
structural forces, worker characteristics, and expressions of individual
agency.”99  A deeper understanding of the factors affecting workers’ be-
Similarly, Professor Shannon Gleeson’s analysis of interviews with forty-one Latino workers
in the California and Texas restaurant industries suggests that immigration status shapes em-
ployees’ activities “irrespective of the extent of rights offered to” undocumented workers by
workplace law. See Shannon Gleeson, Labor Rights for All? The Role of Undocumented Im-
migrant Status for Worker Claims Making, 35 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 561, 563 (2010). See also
id. at 592 (stating that their exclusion as immigrants but inclusion as workers “creates a cogni-
tive dilemma whereby undocumented immigrants . . . are left wondering if, indeed, they have
the right to have rights.”).
95 See Saucedo & Morales, supra note 94.
96 Id. at 642–43.
97 Garcia, supra note 75, at 671.
98 Jayesh M. Rathod, Beyond the “Chilling Effect”: Immigrant Worker Behavior and the
Regulation of Occupational Safety & Health, 14 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 267 (2010).
99 Id. at 293.
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havior, Rathod argues, can tell us how to develop legal rules that better
protect marginalized workers.100
VII. IMMPLOYMENT “FIXES”
Scholars, commentators, and some state governments have begun to
develop proposals, what I call immployment “fixes,” to address many of
the negative effects identified above in Part VI.  While it is beyond the
scope of this Article to discuss all of them here,101 a brief outline of some
of the major developments in this area should underscore the growing
interest in ameliorative proposals to address immigration law’s negative
effects on collective activity and employees’ workplace protections.
Scholars have proposed to address the current conflicts between im-
migration law and workplace law through comprehensive immigration
reform, which would, among other things, legalize the status of currently
undocumented workers.  According to Professor Michael Wishnie, for
instance, this kind of immigration reform “may reasonably be character-
ized as the most significant labor reform in a generation” because it
would bolster workplace protections for both documented and undocu-
mented workers.102  As an additional solution, Wishnie and others have
also called for the repeal of IRCA’s employer sanctions regime in its
entirety.103
100 Id. at 293–94.  For studies that explore worker narratives to explain worker behavior
see Saucedo and Morales, supra note 94 (finding that status does affect behavior); Shannon
Gleeson, Labor Rights for All? The Role of Undocumented Immigrant Status for Worker
Claims Making, 35 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 561 (2010) (same).
101 For other proposals not specifically discussed here see Griffith, supra note 2, at
411–50 (developing a preemption framework that recognizes conflicts between subfederal em-
ployment-related immigration laws and federal employment policies); Lee, supra note 4, at
1142–45 (proposing audits of employers who report their employees to immigration authori-
ties and widespread use of  “the exclusionary rule” in immigration cases that rely on evidence
obtained during a worksite action instigated by an employer report); Michael C. Duff, Embrac-
ing Paradox: Three Problems the NLRB Must Confront to Resist Further Erosion of Labor
Rights in the Expanding Immigrant Workplace, 30 BERKELEY J. EMPL. & LAB. L. 133, 139
(2009) (calling for the NLRB’s “development of immigration-conscious investigative proce-
dures” to improve the enforcement of the NLRA).
102 Michael J. Wishnie, Labor Law After Legalization, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1446, 1447
(2008) (emphasis added). See also id. at 1447–48 (“The proposed legislation would have
given millions of undocumented workers more robust labor and employment rights.  These
workers would have also been able to assert the limited workplace rights they already had,
even as undocumented workers, with a vastly diminished risk of deportation.  Millions more
U.S. workers also would have benefited from the increased protections arising from the en-
forcement of workplace rights by noncitizen workers.”).
103 See Bacon & Hing, supra note 33, at 104–05 (“We need to see migrants as human
beings first and then formulate a policy to protect their human and labor rights, along with
those of other working people in this country.  Repealing employer sanctions is critical in
moving us in that direction.”); Wishnie, supra note 4, at 217 (calling for the repeal of em-
ployer sanctions). But see Peter H. Schuck, Taking Immigration Federalism Seriously, 2007
U. CHI. LEGAL F. 57, 79 (2007) (disagreeing with the proposal to repeal the employer sanc-
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There is a group of proposals that specifically relates to the Su-
preme Court’s Hoffman case.  Some call for a “Hoffman fix” which
would entail federal and state legislative responses that overturn or mini-
mize the effect of the Supreme Court’s interpretation of IRCA’s effects
on the NLRA.104  California passed such a law in 2002, making “immi-
gration status irrelevant for the enforcement of state labor, employment,
civil rights and employee housing laws.”105  Along with legislative solu-
tions, scholars have proposed that courts adopt post-Hoffman legal analy-
ses that are consistent with both immigration and workplace policy
goals.106
Along with the legislative and judicial proposals above, scholars
have proposed what may be best characterized as administrative or
agency fixes.  One common solution is for labor agencies to heighten
their enforcement of existing employee protections in low-wage and im-
migrant workplaces.107  Another recommendation is for labor inspectors
to work closely with worker organizations to improve enforcement.108
Moreover, Professor Leticia Saucedo has called on agencies to enhance
their use of “U” visas as immigration law remedies in cases involving
undocumented employees who are in removal proceedings but have suf-
fered serious workplace law abuses.109
In a complimentary vein, Professor Stephen Lee has proposed that
the DOL closely monitor ICE’s workplace-based immigration enforce-
ment efforts.  Unlike Saucedo’s fix, this coordination would occur before
tions regime entirely and stating that “[e]ven weakly enforced sanctions are likely to have
some deterrent effect (since many if not most employers presumably want to comply with the
law), and there are a number of ways to strengthen sanctions.”).
104 See, e.g., Maria Pabon Lopez, The Place of the Undocumented Worker in the United
States Legal System After Hoffman Plastics Compounds: An Assessment and Comparison with
Argentina’s Legal System, 15 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV., 301, 332 (2004).
105 See id.
106 See, e.g., Ruben J. Garcia, Ghost Workers in an Interconnected World: Going Beyond
the Dichotomies of Domestic Immigration and Labor Laws, 36 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 737,
765 (2003) (“Labor law and immigration law reform are both needed, but until that happens,
courts must reconcile separate bodies of law in a way that serves the stated policy objectives of
both statutory schemes.”). See generally Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, Redefining the Rights
of Undocumented Workers, 58 AM. U. L. REV. 1361 (2009).
107 See, e.g., Garcia, supra note 75 at 671 (stating that “legal status is necessary but not
sufficient to protect immigrant workers and that “[t]here must also be attention to the enforce-
ment of existing rights for immigrants and citizens alike.”).
108 See Janice Fine & Jennifer Gordon, Strengthening Labor Standards Enforcement
Through Partnerships with Workers’ Organizations, 38 POL. & SOC’Y 552, 553, 560–62
(2010).
109 See generally Saucedo, supra note 4 (proposing enhanced use of “U” visas while
acknowledging some of its limitations for fully addressing the scope of the problem). See also
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, U.S. Labor Department to Exercise Authority to Certify
Applications for U visas (Mar. 18, 2010), available at http://www.dol.gov/opa/media/press/
opa/OPA20100312.htm.
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CJP\21-3\CJP301.txt unknown Seq: 27 10-APR-12 9:35
2012] UNDOCUMENTED WORKERS 637
ICE initiates an enforcement action at a particular workplace.110  This
kind of interagency monitoring, according to Lee, would heighten the
incentives for immigration authorities to “stop and think” about effects
on employees’ workplace protections before they engage in worksite im-
migration enforcement.111
In her article, Transnational Labor Citizenship, Professor Jennifer
Gordon proposes a more international solution to the problem.112  In do-
ing so, she joins other scholars who have ventured beyond the domestic
sphere to develop proposed solutions.113  Gordon advocates a “model
that would tie immigration status to membership in organizations of
transnational workers rather than to a particular employer.” 114  Workers
who become members of these transnational worker organizations
“would commit to the core value of labor citizenship” which Gordon
describes as “solidarity with other workers in the United States, ex-
pressed as a commitment to refuse to work under conditions that violate
the law or labor agreements.”115
As the above discussion illustrates, these wide ranging proposals
challenge the workplace law-immigration law dichotomy and constitute
yet another branch of the burgeoning immployment law field.
VIII. IMMPLOYMENT ADVOCACY
Finally, the integration of immigration and workplace issues is evi-
dent in the legislative efforts of advocates.  Some policy advocacy pro-
posals, for instance, embrace some of the ways that immigration policy
intertwines with workplace protections.116  Muzaffar Chishti’s presenta-
tion at the Crossing the Borders Workshop, entitled “Admitting Foreign
Workers in a Comprehensive Immigration Reform,” serves as an exam-
110 Lee, supra note 1, at 1136.
111 Id. at 1123. See also Griffith, supra note 24, at 1142 (contending that labor protec-
tions are primary to ICE’s mission and that education about the separation between immigra-
tion and labor enforcement is key to the efficacy of Lee’s proposal).
112 Jennifer Gordon, Transnational Labor Citizenship, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 503 (2007).
113 For others that propose international strategies, see generally Beth Lyon, The Un-
signed United Nations Migrant Worker Rights Convention: An Overlooked Opportunity to
Change the ‘Brown Collar’ and Migration Paradigm, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 389
(2010) and Michael J. Wishnie, Immigrant Workers and the Domestic Enforcement of Interna-
tional Labor Standards, 4 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 529 (2002).  These proposals suggest that
immployment law is not purely a domestic phenomenon.
114 See Gordon, supra note 112, at 509.
115 Id.
116 See Ruth Milkman, Immigrant Workers and the Future of American Labor, 26 A.B.A.
J. LAB. & EMP. L. 295, 308 (2011) (“From the perspective of low-wage immigrant workers,
any meaningful legal reform effort must encompass the realms of employment and immigra-
tion law as well as labor law.”).
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ple.117  He described the Migration Policy Institute’s immigration propo-
sal to create “provisional visas,” which could build in more flexibility for
workers whose intent to stay in the United States is neither purely tempo-
rary nor purely permanent.118  Mr. Chishti underscored that these em-
ployment-based immigration visas need to “maximize” workplace
protections for foreign workers and “minimize” negative impacts on
workplace protections for U.S.-born workers.119
The focus on workers within the immigrant rights movement as well
as the focus on immigrants within the labor movement further demon-
strates what could be described as an emerging immployment advocacy
agenda.  Indeed, today’s immigrant rights movement has been aptly de-
scribed as “both a civil rights movement and a labor movement” because
of its overlapping policy concerns.120  Even though the immigrant rights
movement’s main focus is to advocate intensively for comprehensive im-
migration law reform at the federal level and against what it views as
anti-immigrant legislation at the state level, workplace concerns are part
of this broader agenda.  One of the key policy goals of the immigrant
rights movement is to achieve safe and just economic opportunities for
undocumented workers.121
Recently, the labor movement has been engaged in immployment
advocacy as well.  Professor Ruben Garcia’s Essay in this issue high-
lights the labor movement’s marked shift to a pro-immigrant policy ad-
vocacy agenda over the last decade.122  Currently, the labor movement’s
view is that “America needs an immigration system that works for work-
ers” regardless of immigration status.123
In recent years, the labor movement has often framed the need for
immigration reform squarely as a workplace issue.  From labor’s point of
view, immigration law reform could positively affect wages, working
117 Muzaffar Chishti, Admitting Foreign Workers in a Comprehensive Immigration Re-
form, Presentation at the Cornell ISS Workshop on Labor Immigration: Good or Bad for
America? (Sept. 23, 2011) (presentation available at http://www.ctl1.com/publicaccess/iss/iss-
sem-20110923-eng-mc/index.htm).
118 Id. See generally DEMETRIOS G. PAPADEMETRIOU ET AL., MIGRATION POLICY INST.,
ALIGNING TEMPORARY IMMIGRATION VISAS WITH US LABOR MARKET NEEDS: THE CASE FOR A
NEW SYSTEM OF PROVISIONAL VISAS (2009), available at http://www.migrationpolicy.org/
pubs/Provisional_visas.pdf (describing full provisional visa proposal).
119 Chishti, supra note 117.
120 Milkman, supra note 116, at 295.
121 Id.
122 Garcia, supra note 75, at 668–69.
123 See AFL–CIO, IMMIGRATION, http://www.aflcio.org/Issues/Immigration (last visited
Nov. 5, 2011); see also Milkman, supra note 116, at 295 (“[I]mmigrant organizing and advo-
cacy have infused the beleaguered U.S. labor movement with new energy, new tactics, and
new ideas.”).
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conditions, workplace rights, job security, and job opportunities.124  For
instance, in May 2011, AFL–CIO President Richard Trumka proclaimed
that workers across the country were “standing together on May Day to
remind the President and Congress that the fight for workers’ rights and
immigrant rights are cut of the same cloth.”125  These shifts, along with
the Hoffman decision, have fostered ties between the immigrant rights
and labor movements.126
In short, immployment advocacy appears to have taken hold.  The
inclusion of concerns for employees’ workplace protections within a
wider immigration policy advocacy agenda challenges the historical sep-
aration between immigration and workplace law.  This trend also raises a
number of burgeoning questions.  For instance, could New Deal era legal
protections of some forms of collective “labor advocacy” reach employ-
ees’ contemporary immployment advocacy efforts?127  What implications
do these hybrid advocacy efforts have for scholars interested in how
“subordinate groups” use “legality claims” to advance their interests?128
CONCLUSION
It is not just the expanding undocumented workforce and its greater
likelihood of experiencing workplace law violations that should convince
us to jointly analyze immigration and workplace law.  The rise of federal
and subfederal immployment laws as well as immployment enforcement
initiatives, analyses, tensions, “fixes,” and advocacy have also estab-
lished the existence of, and the need for, further examination of this in-
creasingly critical field of inquiry.129
While this Article focused largely on undocumented workers, it is
important to note that the scope of the immployment law field reaches
124 See Griffith & Lee, supra note 74 (examining labor’s recent immigration advocacy
statements and illustrating how they relate to wages, working conditions, workplace rights, job
security, and job opportunities).
125 Richard Trumka, Workers must unite for better immigration policy, THE HILL’S CONG.
BLOG (Apr. 28, 2011), http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/civil-rights/158107-workers-
must-unite-for-better-immigration-policy.
126 See Scott L. Cummings, The Internationalization of Public Interest Law, 57 DUKE L.J.
891, 914 (2008) (contending that Hoffman encouraged “greater coordination among immigrant
rights advocates and greater investments in immigrant rights from organized labor.”).
127 For a comprehensive discussion of the ways that labor’s recent framing of its immi-
gration advocacy falls within NLRA protection, see Griffith & Lee, supra note 74.
128 Maria Lorena Cook, “Humanitarian Advocacy Is Never a Crime”: Humanitarianism
and Illegality in Migrant Advocacy, 45 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 561, 587 (2011).
129 The process of immigration itself also affects domestic workplace law. See Kati L.
Griffith, Globalizing U.S. Employment Statutes Through Foreign Law Influence: Mexico’s
Foreign Employer Provision and Recruited Mexican Workers, 29 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J.
383, 425 (2008) (“Given that it is increasingly common that citizens of one nation will work in
another future research should continue to explore theories of foreign law influence on U.S.
labor and employment law.”).
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beyond undocumented workers.  Many documented immigrant workers,
for instance, also straddle immigration and workplace law.130  Moreover,
the treatment of immigrant workers, documented and undocumented
alike, may have broader effects on the wages, working conditions, and
collective organizing efforts of U.S.-born workers.131
Through an illustration of the myriad ways that immigration law
and employment protections interact in both positive and negative ways,
this Article has argued for an immployment law agenda.  It also raised
lines of inquiry that demand the attention of courts, agencies, scholars,
and policymakers.  An analytical lens that simultaneously considers im-
migration law and workplace law allows us to examine the effects that
these two areas of law have on each other and to develop ways to better
harmonize these two areas of law in the future.  In sum, it is time to cross
the borders of immigration and workplace law.
130 See Kati L. Griffith, U.S. Migrant Worker Law: The Interstices of Immigration Law
and Labor and Employment Law, 31 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 125, 137–38 (2009) (describ-
ing barriers to workplace protections for documented guest workers).  For a recent labor-based
critique of an immigration visa category, see Amber McKinney, Increased Scrutiny of J-1 Visa
Program Means Employers Must Step Up Compliance, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 214, at B-
3 (Nov. 4, 2011) (stating that the J-1 visa program “was designed to encourage cultural ex-
changes” for foreign students but that worker groups cite labor violations and view the pro-
gram “as a source of cheap labor” for employers).
131 See Fisk & Wishnie, supra note 2, at 399–400 (describing how treatment of individual
employees affects workplace standards of employees more broadly).
